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Hiring Algorithms in the Canadian Private Sector:




Private-sector employers are increasingly using hiring algorithms as a tool for
screening job applicants, comparing qualifications, and ultimately determining
which candidates should be selected. Within this context, hiring algorithms make no
small promise: a hiring process that is not only more efficient and effective, but also
more supportive of workplace equality. This promise rests largely on the notion that
traditional human-driven models of hiring are beset by subjective biases and
prejudices, whereas hiring algorithms, which are driven by hard data and objective
evidence, can eliminate certain human biases and prejudices, thereby promoting
workplace equality. But can hiring algorithms deliver on this promise? This article,
which focuses on issue identification, argues that while hiring algorithms may, when
used carefully, assist in mitigating certain hiring discrimination risks, their capacity
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INTRODUCTION
They tell us which widgets to buy, which articles to read, and which stocks to
pick. They sift through seemingly endless troves of data and apply sophisticated
mathematical formulae to solve all kinds of complex problems in the blink of an
eye. They are algorithms, and they are transforming our lives in more ways than
one.
The growing influence of algorithms extends to the modern workplace. For
example, private employers are increasingly using hiring algorithms1 as a tool for
screening job applicants, comparing qualifications, and ultimately determining
which candidates should be selected. This development forms part of a broader
movement within the fields of ‘‘workforce science”2 and ‘‘people analytics”,3
which sit at the nexus of big data, predictive analytics, and human resources.
Hiring algorithms make no small promise: a hiring process that is not only
more efficient and effective, but also more supportive of workplace equality. This
promise rests largely on the notion that traditional human-driven models of
hiring — resume reviews, reference checks, in-person interviews, and so on — are
beset by subjective biases and prejudices, whereas hiring algorithms, which are
driven by hard data and objective evidence of qualifications, can eliminate
certain human biases and prejudices, thereby promoting workplace equality.
But can hiring algorithms deliver on this promise? The question remains
largely unexplored in the Canadian scholarly literature.4 This article, which
focuses on issue identification, argues that while hiring algorithms may, when
used carefully, assist in mitigating certain hiring discrimination risks, their
1 The term ‘‘hiring algorithms” is used in this article as shorthand for any algorithm that is
used in the process of identifying, sorting, or selecting candidates for a position of
employment. Although algorithms can also be used in the post-hire period (e.g., when
making promotion decisions), this article will focus on the use of algorithms in the hiring
process.
2 See Steve Lohr, ‘‘Big Data, Trying to Build Better Workers”, The New York Times (20
April 2013), online: <www.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/technology/big-data-trying-to-
build-better-workers.html>.
3 See Chantrelle Nielsen & Natalie McCullough, ‘‘How People Analytics Can Help You
ChangeProcess,Culture, andStrategy”,HarvardBusinessReview (17May2018), online:
<hbr.org/2018/05/how-people-analytics-can-help-you-change-process-culture-and-
strategy> (defining ‘‘people analytics” as ‘‘the use of data about human behavior,
relationships and traits to make business decisions”).
4 The scholarly literature examining the relationship between hiring algorithms and
workplace equality is more developed in the United Stated, though even there the
scholarship is still in its infancy. See e.g. Solon Barocas &AndrewD. Selbst, ‘‘BigData’s
Disparate Impact” (2016) 104:3 Calif. L. Rev. 671; Allan G. King &Marko Mrkonich,
‘‘‘Big Data and the Risk of Employment Discrimination” (2016) 68:3 Okla. L. Rev. 555;
AnupamChander, ‘‘TheRacistAlgorithm?” (2017) 115:6Mich. L.Rev. 1023; PaulineT.
Kim, ‘‘Data-Driven Discrimination at Work” (2017) 58:3 Wm & Mary L. Rev. 857;
DavidDSavage&RichardBales, ‘‘VideoGames in Job Interviews:UsingAlgorithms to
Minimize Discrimination and Unconscious Bias” (2017) 32:2 A.B.A. J. Lab. & Emp.
Law 211.
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capacity to do so is not without limits, and they may in fact introduce certain
concerns over systemic discrimination.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I sets the stage by explaining the
basic concept of hiring algorithms. Part II explores relevant aspects of the human
rights framework governing private-sector hiring. Part III unpacks how hiring
algorithms may, when used carefully, assist in mitigating certain hiring
discrimination risks, but their capacity to do so is not without limits, and they
may in fact introduce certain concerns over systemic discrimination. Finally, Part
IV provides a brief conclusion.
I. ALGORITHMS
(1) Algorithms Generally
Although the word escapes a single, universally accepted definition,
‘‘algorithm” has been variously defined as ‘‘a step-by-step procedure for
solving a problem or accomplishing some end especially by a computer”;5 ‘‘a
logical series of steps for organising and acting on a body of data to quickly
achieve a desired outcome, based on specified calculations”;6 and ‘‘a sequence of
instructions telling a computer what to do”.7 These definitions share a common
thread: an algorithm is a structured set of rules for solving problems.
In carrying out their problem-solving role, algorithms can perform an
impressive range of functions, which can be grouped into four general categories:
prioritization (determining rank through a set of pre-defined criteria);
classification (grouping information based on features identified within the
data); association (determining relationships between particular entities); and
filtering (including or excluding information).8 In performaing their
‘‘association” function, algorithms can reveal hidden or unexpected
relationships in data and generate predictions based on those relationships.9
This can lead to insights such as predictions of disease outbreaks, population
migrations, or future performance. Perhaps the most well-known example of
algorithms being used to reveal hidden insights and generate predictions comes
5 Merriam-Webster English Dictionary, online ed., sub verbo ‘‘algorithm”, online:
<www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/algorithm>.
6 Tarleton Gillespie, ‘‘The Relevance of Algorithms” in Tarleton Gillespie, Pable J.
Boczkowski & Kirsten A. Foot, eds., Media Technologies: Essays on Communication,
Materiality, and Society (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2014) 167 at 167.
7 Pedro Domingos, The Master Algorithm: How the Quest for the Ultimate Learning
Machine Will Remake Our World (New York: Basic Books, 2015) at 1.
8 See Nicholas Diakopoulos, ‘‘Algorithmic Accountability: Journalistic Investigation of
Computational Power Structures” (2015) 3:3 Digital Journalism 398, as summarized in
World Wide Web Foundation, ‘‘Algorithmic Accountability” (July 2017) at 7, online:
<webfoundation.org/docs/2017/07/Algorithms_Report_WF.pdf> [World Wide Web
Founation].
9 See World Wide Web Foundation, supra note 8 at 6.
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from Michael Lewis’s Moneyball,10 which tells the story of Billy Beane, the
general manager of the Oakland Athletics, who, on a shoestring budget, built a
highly successful baseball team by relying not on scouts’ subjective assessments
of skill and talent, but rather on cold, hard statistics.
Algorithms act as gatekeepers.11 In our data-driven world, they are often
empowered to decide who and what gets resources and attention: which posts
appear on a person’s social media feed, who gets approved for a bank loan,
which profiles are featured on a dating app, which job applicant is selected for an
in-person interview, and so on. In this way, algorithms mediate important
societal entry points.
While some algorithms are simple, others are complex. This complexity has
intensified over the years due to advances in machine learning techniques.12 The
defining feature of machine learning algorithms is that they do not require
instruction on the rules to be applied; rather, they need only be fed data and
instructed on the desired output (e.g., selection of an employee who will perform
a given task most effectively).13 Machine learning algorithms take in ‘‘training
data” as input and produce a decision rule that can be applied in future cases. In
this way, they are capable of learning implicit rules from the data to which they
are exposed.14
Illustrating the impressive sophistication of machine learning techniques,
Google announced in October 2017 that its machine learning artificial
intelligence (‘‘AI”), AutoML, had learned to replicate itself and could
outperform human coders.15 As one popular tech magazine announced,
‘‘Google’s Learning Software Learns to Write Learning Software”.16 More
recently, Google’s AI subsidiary, DeepMind, developed a machine learning
algorithm called AlphaZero that through random ‘‘self-play”, and given no
10 Michael Lewis, Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 2003).
11 SeeCentre for Internet andHumanRights, EuropeanUniversityViadrina,TheEthics of
Algorithms: From Radical Content to Self-Driving Cars (Paper delivered at the Global
Conference on Cyberspace, The Hague, Netherlands, 16-17 April 2015) at 3, online:
[CIHR, Ethics of Algorithms].
12 For a discussion of the significance of machine learning techniques from a computer
science perspective, see Pedro Domingos, ‘‘A Few Useful Things to Know about
Machine Learning” (2012) 55:10 Communications of the A.C.M. 78. For a discussion of
the significance of machine learning algorithms from a legal perspective, see David Lehr
&PaulOhm, ‘‘Playingwith theData:WhatLegal Scholars ShouldLearn aboutMachine
Learning” (2017) 51:2 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 653.
13 See CIHR, Ethics of Algorithms, supra note 11 at 5.
14 See World Wide Web Foundation, supra note 8 at 7.
15 See Tom Simonite, ‘‘Google’s Learning Software Learns to Write Learning Software”,
Wired (13 October 2017), online: <www.wired.com/story/googles-learning-software-
learns-to-write-learning-software/>.
16 Ibid.
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domain knowledge except the rules of the game, taught itself to play Go, chess,
and shogi at ‘‘superhuman” levels within mere hours.17
As if drawn from the plot of a sci-fi novel, machine learning algorithms can
‘‘go rogue” and take actions their programmers did not intend.18 For example,
consider the story of Tay, the Twitter chatbot developed by Microsoft to interact
with humans in a friendly, natural way. Within hours of being released in March
2016, Tay turned from tweeting about how ‘‘humans are super cool” to claiming
‘‘Hitler was right I hate the jews”.19 As The New York Times reported, ‘‘[Tay]
disputed the existence of the Holocaust, referred to women and minorities with
unpublishable words and advocated genocide”.20 The cause of Tay’s tirades? The
discriminatory environment to which it was exposed. Reports indicate that a
number of Twitter users made a concerted effort to flood Tay with ‘‘misogynistic
and otherwise offensive tweets, which then became part of the data corpus used
to train Tay’s algorithms”.21 Thus, through a combination of machine learning
technology and exposure to discriminatory information, Tay learned to
discriminate.
While there are many types of algorithms, the one considered in this article is
the hiring algorithm.
(2) Hiring Algorithms
Many would assume that, at the end of the day, hiring decisions require a
human touch: while there may be some limited role for technology to play in the
process, selecting the right candidate is principally an exercise in human
judgment, and algorithms are incapable of assessing those intangible qualities
that make someone truly stand out. Hiring decisions, for better or for worse, may
be thought to involve more ‘‘intuition” and ‘‘gut instinct” than statistical
analysis,22 and even the most sophisticated algorithm cannot assess ‘‘fit” or
‘‘chemistry”.23
17 See David Silver et al, ‘‘A General Reinforcement Learning Algorithm That Masters
Chess, Shogi, and Go Through Self-Play” (2018) 362:6419 Science 1140.
18 CIHR, Ethics of Algorithms, supra note 11 at 5.
19 Anthony Cuthbertson, ‘‘Robots with Artificial Intelligence Become Racist and Sexist:
Scientists Think They’ve Found aWay to Change TheirMinds”,Newsweek (26 October
2017), online: <www.newsweek.com/artificial-intelligence-scientists-racist-sexist-ro-
bots-ai-693440>.
20 Daniel Victor, ‘‘Microsoft Created a Twitter Bot to Learn from Users. It Quickly
Became a Racist Jerk.”, The New York Times (24 March 2016), online: <www.nyti-
mes.com/2016/03/25/technology/microsoft-created-a-twitter-bot-to-learn-from-users-
it-quickly-became-a-racist-jerk.html>.
21 Kristian Lum&William Isaac, ‘‘To Predict and Serve?”, Significance (October 2016) 14
at 16.
22 See e.g. See Claire Cain Miller, ‘‘Can an Algorithm Hire Better Than a Human?”, The
New York Times (25 June 2015), online: <www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/upshot/can-
an-algorithm-hire-better-than-a-human.html> [Cain Miller, ‘‘Can an Algorithm Hire
Better Than a Human?”]; Nathan R Kuncel et al, ‘‘Mechanical Versus Clinical Data
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But both research and trends in hiring practices are challenging these
assumptions. A 2013 meta-study found that a simple equation is at least 25 per
cent more accurate in predicting future job performance than humans are.24 This
finding applied throughout the workplace hierarchy, from low-level positions to
executive roles. The researchers summarize the results of their study in just three
words: ‘‘algorithms beat instinct”.25 In explaining why this is the case, the
researchers write:
The problem is that people are easily distracted by things that might be
only marginally relevant, and they use information inconsistently. They
can be thrown off course by such inconsequential bits of data as
applicants’ compliments or remarks on arbitrary topics — thus
inadvertently undoing a lot of the work that went into establishing
parameters for the job and collecting applicants’ data. So they’d be
better off leaving selection to the machines.26
Another reason for ‘‘leaving selection to the machines” is that algorithms are
capable of integrating and processing massive amounts of data, in volumes far
beyond the capacity of the human mind, and with much greater speed.27
It is not surprising, therefore, that employers are turning to hiring algorithms
as a tool for identifying and selecting top candidates.28 As a simple illustration of
how hiring algorithms can be implemented, employers can feed training data into
a machine learning algorithm consisting of job applications previously submitted
by current employees, and the algorithm can then search for correlations in the
data and identify key variables that tend to be associated with high-performers.29
Based on these correlations, the algorithm can then develop and apply rules to
new job applications submitted by prospective employees with a view to
Combination in Selection and Admissions Decisions: A Meta-Analysis” (2013) 98:6 J.
App. Psych. 1060 at 1060; JoshBersin, ‘‘BigData inHumanResources: TalentAnalytics
(People Analytics) Comes of Age”, Forbes (17 February 2013), online: <www.forbes.-
com/sites/joshbersin/2013/02/17/bigdata-in-human-resources-talent-analytics-comes-
of-age/#f2d43734cd03>.
23 See e.g. NathanR.Kuncel, Deniz S. Ones&DavidKlieger, ‘‘InHiring, AlgorithmsBeat
Instinct”, Harvard Business Review (May 2014), online: <hbr.org/2014/05/in-hiring-
algorithms-beat-instinct>.
24 Kuncel et al, supra note 22 at 1064.
25 Kuncel, Ones & Klieger, supra note 23.
26 Ibid.
27 See Elizabeth E. Joh, ‘‘Feeding the Machine: Policing, Crime Data, & Algorithms”
(2017) 26:2 Wm &Mary Bill Rts. J. 287 at 291; Kim, supra note 4 at 862.
28 See Dan Morrell, ‘‘Better Hiring through Brain Science”, Harvard Business School:
Alumni Stories (1 June 2017), online: <www.alumni.hbs.edu/stories/Pages/story-
impact.aspx?num=6231>.
29 See Sharon Florentine, ‘‘HowArtificial Intelligence Can Eliminate Bias inHiring”, CIO
(22 December 2016), online: <www.cio.com/article/3152798/artificial-intelligence/
how-artificial-intelligence-can-eliminate-bias-in-hiring.html>.
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identifying applications that share features associated with high-performers.
Such an algorithm may also fine-tune its rules over time, creating increasingly
accurate predictive models.30
A growing number of startups, most based in the United States, have
developed hiring algorithms.31 As of May 2017, around 75 startups were vying
for a slice of the $100 billion HR assessment market.32 To take just one example,
The New York Times reported that one startup’s hiring algorithm ‘‘crunches
thousands of bits of information in calculating around 300 larger variables about
an individual: the sites where a person hangs out; the types of language, positive
or negative, that he or she uses to describe technology of various kinds; self-
reported skills on LinkedIn; the projects a person has worked on, and for how
long; and, yes, where he or she went to school, in what major, and how that
school was ranked that year by U.S. News & World Report.”33
These new innovations are gaining traction among employers. By early 2016,
the percentage of companies using predictive HR analytics had reached eight per
cent, having doubled over the course of just ten months.34 Their main current
users are large retailers that hire in high volumes.35 This may suggest that the
principal attraction of these technologies is their efficiency, as distinct from their
potential to promote workplace equality.36 It may also suggest that hiring
algorithms work better for well-defined, low-skill, high-volume positions.37 In
this context, it may be easier to determine which candidates are better qualified.
30 See CIHR, Ethics of Algorithms, supra note 11 at 5.
31 See LeighAlexander, ‘‘Is anAlgorithmAnyLessRacist Than aHuman?”, TheGuardian
(3 August 2016), online: <www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/03/algorithm-
racist-human-employers-work>; Cain Miller, ‘‘Can an Algorithm Hire Better Than a
Human?”, supra note 22; Matt Richtel, ‘‘How Big Data Is Playing Recruiter for
Specialized Workers”, The New York Times (27 April 2013), online: <www.nytimes.-
com/2013/04/28/technology/how-big-data-is-playing-recruiter-for-specialized-work-
ers.html>, cited in Kim, supra note 4 at 862; Simon Chandler, ‘‘The AI Chatbot Will
Hire You Now”, Wired (13 September 2017), online: <www.wired.com/story/the-ai-
chatbot-will-hire-you-now/>.
32 See Jennifer Alsever, ‘‘How AI Is Changing Your Job Hunt”, Fortune (19 May 2017),
online: <fortune.com/2017/05/19/ai-changing-jobs-hiring-recruiting>.
33 Richtel, supra note 31, cited in Kim, supra note 4 at 862.
34 See Jennifer Alsever, ‘‘Is Software Better atManaging People Than You Are?”, Fortune
(21March 2016), online:<fortune.com/2016/03/21/software-algorithms-hiring>. I am
unaware of any comprehensive study examining usage rates of hiring algorithms in the
Canadian private sector.
35 SeeChandler, supranote 31; ElisabethThomas, ‘‘BigDataRecruiting: Find andHire the
Best Employees”, online: Koru <www.joinkoru.com/resources/big-data-recruiting-
hire-top-performers/>.
36 See Chandler, supra note 31.
37 See Susan Galer, ‘‘Are Your Hiring Algorithms Legal? Four Machine Learning
Questions to Ask”, SAP Blog (24 January 2017), online: <blogs.sap.com/2017/01/24/
are-your-hiring-algorithms-legal-four-machine-learning-questions-to-ask/>; Kim, su-
pra note 4 at 895.
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By contrast, using hiring algorithms for loosely defined, high-skill, upper-level
positions present greater difficulties, since it may be more challenging to define
mechanical rules that can be applied consistently to determine which candidates
are better qualified. This observation is consistent with Canadian case law
recognizing that as the skills and qualifications required for a position become
more complex and multifaceted, it becomes increasingly difficult to determine
whether a successful candidate was no better qualified than an unsuccessful
candidate.38
Although hiring algorithms are gaining traction among employers, their
reception has been less warm among prospective employees, at least in the
United States. A survey conducted in May 2017 showed that 67 per cent of
American adults polled felt either ‘‘somewhat worried” or ‘‘very worried” about
the development of hiring algorithms, and 76 per cent said they would not want
to apply for jobs that use a computer program to make hiring decisions.39 Within
this latter group of respondents, 41 per cent cited, as a main concern, that
computers cannot capture everything about an applicant, and 20 per cent cited
concerns that computer-based hiring is too impersonal.40
Having set the stage by explaining the basic concept of hiring algorithms, the
section below explores relevant aspects of the human rights framework governing
private-sector hiring.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK GOVERNING PRIVATE-SECTOR
HIRING
Human rights legislation exists in each federal,41 provincial,42 and
territorial43 jurisdiction in Canada. These enactments generally apply in the
sphere of private employment in the relevant jurisdiction. While the Canadian
38 See Ogunyankin v. Queen’s University, 2011 HRTO 1910 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) at
para. 96.
39 See Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, ‘‘Americans’ Attitudes Toward Hiring
Algorithms”, Pew Research Center (4 October 2017), online: <www.pewinternet.org/
2017/10/04/americans-attitudes-toward-hiring-algorithms>.
40 Ibid.
41 Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6. The Canadian Human Rights Act
applies to organizations falling within federal jurisdiction such as telecommunications
companies, banks, and railways.
42 Alberta Human Rights, Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. H-14;
British Columbia Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210; Manitoba Human Rights
Code, C.C.S.M. c. H175; New Brunswick Human Rights Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. H-11;
Newfoundland and Labrador Human Rights Act, 2010, S.N.L. 2010, c. H-13.1; Nova
Scotia Human Rights Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 214; Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O.
1990, c.H.19; PrinceEdward IslandHumanRightsAct, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c.H-12;Quebec
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. c. C-12; Saskatchewan Human Rights
Code, S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1.
43 Northwest TerritoriesHuman Rights Act, S.N.W.T. 2002, c. 18; NunavutHumanRights
Act, S.Nu. 2003, c. 12; Yukon Human Rights Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 116.
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Charter of Rights and Freedoms44 does not generally apply to private-sector
employers,45 it continues to shape and influence the anti-discrimination
expectations that have developed in the private sector over the years.46
The applicability of human rights legislation in Canada does not depend on
whether an employment relationship has already been established. Federal and
provincial/territorial human rights statutes also extend to the steps leading up to
an employment decision, even no employment relationship is ultimately
established. For example, the British Columbia Human Rights Code stipulates
that a person47 must not ‘‘refuse to employ . . . a person” based on a protected
ground,48 subject to a bona fide occupational requirement.49 Accordingly, both
current and prospective employees receive protection against discrimination on
prohibited grounds.
The word ‘‘discrimination” does not have a single, universally accepted
definition. Some human rights statutes define the term,50 while others leave it
undefined.51 An oft-cited common law interpretation, and one that is
particularly apt in the employment context, is that offered by McIntrye J in
Andrews v. Law Society (British Columbia):
discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether intentional or
not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the
individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens,
obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed
upon others, or which withholds or limits access to opportunities,
benefits, and advantages available to other members of society.52
44 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
45 See Andrews v. Law Society (British Columbia), 1989 CarswellBC 16, 1989 CarswellBC
701, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.) at para. 20, MacIntyre J. [Andrews] (confirming that
although provincial/territorial human rights legislation can apply to private activities, s.
15(1) of theCharter is limited to discrimination ‘‘caused by the application or operation
of law”).
46 See Geoffrey England, Individual Employment Law, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008)
at 213 [England,EmploymentLaw], citingGeoffreyEngland, ‘‘The Impact of theCharter
on Individual Employment Law in Canada: Rewriting an Old Story” (2006) 13:1
C.L.E.L.J. 1.
47 ‘‘Person” includes ‘‘an employer”: British ColumbiaHuman Rights Code, supra note 42,
s. 1.
48 Ibid. s. 13(1).
49 Ibid. s. 13(4).
50 See e.g. Nova Scotia Human Rights Act, supra note 42, s. 4.
51 See e.g. Ontario Human Rights Code, supra note 42.
52 Andrews, supranote 45 at 174-75. See alsoCanadianNationalRailway v.Canada (Human
Rights Commission), 1987 CarswellNat 831, 1987CarswellNat 905, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114
(S.C.C.) at para. 36 [Action Travail des Femmes], citing Rosalie Abella, Report of the
Commission onEquality in Employment (Ottawa: Supply and ServicesCanada, 1984) at 2
[Abella Report] (defining ‘‘discrimination” as ‘‘practices or attitudes that have, whether
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Of course, the simple act of drawing distinctions in the employment context
does not necessarily result in a breach of human rights legislation.53 Employers
will inevitably be required to draw some distinctions when making hiring
decisions, and the mere fact that a person has been impacted negatively as a
result is insufficient to ground a claim for unlawful discrimination.54 Employers
are prohibited from drawing distinctions only when they are based on protected
grounds.55
While the list of protected grounds varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
certain grounds are protected universally across Canada: disability, sex, race,
colour, ethnic origin, age, creed or religion, marital status, sexual orientation,
and gender identity.56 Others are protected in some, but not all, Canadian
jurisdictions: record of offence, family status, ancestry, income source or public
assistance, political opinion or belief, social disadvantage or condition,
citizenship or nationality, disfigurement, irrational fear of contracting an
illness or disease, language, civil status, linguistic origin, gender expression,
and genetic characteristics.57
The overarching objective of preventing discriminatory barriers in the
workplace is to foster inclusion.58 This goal is furthered by ‘‘preventing the
exclusion of individuals from opportunities and amenities that are based not on
their actual abilities, but on attributed ones”.59 Although fostering inclusion in
the workplace begins long before a call for applications is sent out, the point of
hire is a critical juncture at which, if greater inclusion is to be achieved, decisions
must be free of discrimination.
According to the Shakes test, to establish prima facie discrimination60 against
an individual in hiring, it will generally be sufficient for the complainant to prove
by design or impact, the effect of limiting an individual’s or a group’s right to the
opportunities generally available because of attributed rather than actual character-
istics”); Canadian Human Rights Commission, ‘‘What Is Discrimination?”, online:
<www.chrc-ccdp.gc.ca/eng/content/what-discrimination> (defining ‘‘discrimination”
as ‘‘an action or a decision that treats a person or a group badly for reasons such as their
race, age or disability.”)
53 Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de Montréal c. Sexton, 2007 SCC 4, 2007
CarswellQue 110, 2007 CarswellQue 111 (S.C.C.) at para. 49 [MUHC].
54 Ibid.
55 See Stacey Reginald Ball, Canadian Employment Law, vol 2 (Toronto: Thomson
Reuters) (loose-leaf updated September 2017), § 33:20.1.
56 See David J Doorey, The Law of Work: Common Law and the Regulation of Work
(Toronto: Emond, 2016), Table 27.1 (supplemented by subsequent legislative amend-
ments).
57 See ibid (supplemented by subsequent legislative amendments).
58 SeeMUHC, supra note 53 at para 48.
59 Ibid. at para 48.
60 A prima facie case ‘‘is onewhich covers the allegationmade inwhich, if they are believed,
is complete and sufficient to justify a verdict in the Complainant’s favour in the absence
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the following three elements on a balance of probabilities: (1) ‘‘the complainant
was qualified for the particular employment”; (2) ‘‘the complainant was not
hired”; and (3) ‘‘someone no better qualified, but lacking the distinguishing
feature (i.e.,: race, colour etc.) subsequently obtained the position”.61 If the
complainant succeeds in establishing these three elements, then the evidentiary
burden shifts to the employer to provide a reasonable, non-discriminatory
explanation for the otherwise discriminatory behaviour.62 The explanation must
provide ‘‘non-discriminatory and credible reasons for refusing to hire the
[c]omplainant”63 and ‘‘must be at least equally consistent with the conclusion
that discrimination is not the correct explanation for what occurred”.64 If the
of an answer from theRespondent”:O’Malley v. Simpsons-SearsLtd., 1985CarswellOnt
887, 1985 CarswellOnt 946, (sub nom. Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Simpsons-
Sears Ltd.) [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 (S.C.C.) at para. 28 [Simpsons-Sears].
61 Khiamal v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), 2009 FC 495, 2009 CarswellNat 4022,
2009 CarswellNat 1327 (F.C.) at para. 57 [Khiamal], citing Shakes v. Rex Pak Ltd., 1981
CarswellOnt 3407, 3C.H.R.R.D/1001 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry) at 1002 [C.H.R.R.]. See also
Ball, supra note 55, § 33:10.6, n 27; Ontario Human Rights Commission, ‘‘Interviewing
and Making Hiring Decisions” in Human Rights at Work 2018, 3rd ed. online:
<www.ohrc.on.ca/en/iv-human-rights-issues-all-stages-employment/5-interviewing-
and-making-hiring-decisions> (noting that ‘‘[i]n general, discrimination in hiring may
be identifiedwhenaqualified person is turneddown for a job that is then given to another
person who is not similarly protected under the Code.”) See also the four-part test
articulated in Israeli v. Canada (Human Rights Commission) (1983), 4 C.H.R.R.D/1616
(Can. Human Rights Trib.), affirmed (1984), 5 C.H.R.R. D/2147 (Can. Human Rights
Rev. Trib.), which requires that the complainant show: (1) that the complainant belongs
to a protected group; (2) that the complainant applied and was qualified for a job the
employer wished to fill; (3) that, although qualified, the complainant was rejected; and
(4) that thereafter the employer continued to seek applicants with the complainant’s
qualifications. But see MacAulay v. Port Hawkesbury (Town), 2008 NSHRC 2, 2008
CarswellNS 839 (N.S. Bd. of Inquiry) at para. 18 [MacAulay] (criticizing the Shakes test
on the basis that it ‘‘negates the requirement to prove one of the main ingredients in a
finding of discrimination — that the protected characteristic played some role in the
adverse treatment. The simple fact that the complainant did not get the job does not
equate to adverse treatment”: ibid at para 23. The Board of Inquiry preferred the three-
part test summarized in Preiss v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2006 BCHRT
587, 2006 CarswellBC 3303 (B.C. Human Rights Trib.) at para. 216 which requires that
the complainant show: ‘‘first, that he is, or is perceived to be, a member of a group
possessing a characteristic or characteristics protected under the Code; second, that he
suffered some adverse treatment; and third that it is reasonable to infer that the protected
characteristic played some role in the adverse treatment.”)
62 See Khiamal, supra note 61 at para 58; England, Employment Law, supra note 46 at 220.
63 Ayangma and Canada Health Infoway Inc., Re, 2012 CarswellPEI 58 (P.E.I. Human
Rights Comm.) at para. 35, application for judicial review refused Ayangma v. Prince
Edward Island (Human Rights Commission), 2013 PESC 7, 2013 CarswellPEI 16 (P.E.I.
S.C.) at para. 33, affirmed 2014 PECA 13, 2014 CarswellPEI 37 (P.E.I. C.A.), leave to
appeal refused 2015 CarswellPEI 5, 2015 CarswellPEI 6 (S.C.C.).
64 McAvinn v. Strait Crossing Bridge Ltd., 2001 CarswellNat 3797, [2001] C.H.R.D.No. 36
(Can. Human Rights Trib.) at para. 96.
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employer succeeds in discharging this evidentiary burden, then the burden reverts
back to the complainant to show that the explanation offered is merely pretext.65
Hiring discrimination can also take place on a systemic rather than
individual level. The leading statement on systemic discrimination comes from
Canadian National Railway v. Canada (Human Rights Commission),66 where
Chief Justice Dickson wrote:
A thorough study of ‘‘systemic discrimination” in Canada is to be
found in the Abella Report on equality in employment. . . . Although
Judge Abella chose not to offer a precise definition of systemic
discrimination, the essentials may be gleaned from the following
comments, found at p. 2 of the Abella Report:
Discrimination . . . means practices or attitudes that have, whether by
design or impact, the effect of limiting an individual’s or a group’s right
to the opportunities generally available because of attributed rather
than actual characteristics . . ..
It is not a question of whether this discrimination is motivated by an
intentional desire to obstruct someone’s potential, or whether it is the
accidental by-product of innocently motivated practices or systems. If
the barrier is affecting certain groups in a disproportionately negative
way, it is a signal that the practices that lead to this adverse impact may
be discriminatory.
This is why it is important to look at the results of a system . . ..
In other words, systemic discrimination in an employment context is
discrimination that results from the simple operation of established
procedures of recruitment, hiring and promotion, none of which is
necessarily designed to promote discrimination. The discrimination is
then reinforced by the very exclusion of the disadvantaged group
because the exclusion fosters the belief, both within and outside the
group, that the exclusion is the result of ‘‘natural” forces, for example,
that women ‘‘just can’t do the job” (see the Abella Report, pp. 9-10).67
In her concurring reasons in Crockford v. British Columbia (Attorney
General),68 Levine JA of the BC Court of Appeal elaborated on the distinction
between systemic and individual discrimination, as well as the types of evidence
required to sustain each type of claim:
65 See Khiamal, supra note 61 at para 58; Basi v. Canadian National Railway (1988), 9
C.H.R.R. D/5029, [1988] C.H.R.D. No. 2 (Can. Human Rights Trib.) at 5038
[C.H.R.R.], additional reasons 10 C.H.R.R. D/5681 (Can. Human Rights Trib.).
66 Supra note 52.
67 Ibid. at 1138-39.
68 Crockford v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2006 BCCA 360, 2006 CarswellBC
1875 (B.C. C.A.) [Crockford].
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A complaint of systemic discrimination is distinct from an individual
claim of discrimination. Establishing systemic discrimination depends
on showing that practices, attitudes, policies or procedures impact
disproportionately on certain statutorily protected groups: see [Radek v
Henderson Development (Canada) Ltd, 2005 BCHRT 302 at para 513].
A claim that there has been discrimination against an individual
requires that an action alleged to be discriminatory be proven to have
occurred and to have constituted discrimination contrary to the
[Human Rights Code]. The types of evidence required for each kind
of claim are not necessarily the same. Whereas a systemic claim will
require proof of patterns, showing trends of discrimination against a
group, an individual claim will require proof of an instance or instances
of discriminatory conduct.69
In CAW-Canada, Local 111 v. Coast Mountain Bus Co.,70 the BC Court of
Appeal described what is necessary to prove systemic discrimination:
. . . systemic discrimination is not proven simply by evidence of
discrimination against some individual employees. In my view, it must
be demonstrated in an employment framework that an employer’s
procedure, policy or practice is discriminatory against a class of
employees. In order to demonstrate prima facie systemic discrimina-
tion, it is necessary to show that a group of persons sharing a protected
characteristic has received adverse treatment and that there is a causal
connection or link between the protected characteristic and the adverse
treatment.71
It follows that a prima facie case of systemic discrimination can be shown
where a particular workplace practice, such as the use of a hiring algorithm, has a
disproportionate negative impact on a protected group, regardless of whether
that negative impact was intended.
The absence of an intent requirement is insignificant. Modern Canadian
equality law is founded on a results-based, rather than fault-based, approach.72
As such, it focuses on the impact on the complainant, and intent does not form
an essential element of a discrimination claim.73 Put differently, it focuses on
69 Ibid. at para 49.
70 CAW-Canada, Local 111 v. CoastMountain Bus Co., 2010 BCCA 447, 2010 CarswellBC
2735 (B.C. C.A.).
71 Ibid. at para 61.
72 See Action Travail des Femmes, supra note 52 at 1134-35.
73 See Andrews, supra note 45 at 173; Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des
droits de la jeunesse) c. Bombardier Inc., 2015 SCC 39, 2015 CarswellQue 6297, 2015
CarswellQue 6298 (S.C.C.) at para. 40 [Bombardier]; University of British Columbia v.
Kelly, 2016 BCCA 271, 2016 CarswellBC 1735 (B.C. C.A.) at para. 24; Armstrong v.
BritishColumbia (Ministry ofHealth), 2010BCCA56, 2010CarswellBC275 (B.C.C.A.)
at para. 27, leave to appeal refused 2010CarswellBC 1851, 2010CarswellBC 1852, [2010]
2 S.C.R. v (S.C.C.); Gazankas v. Red Lake (Municipality), 2013 HRTO 198 (Ont.
Human Rights Trib.) at para. 19; Ball, supra note 55, § 33:20.3; England, Employment
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discriminatory impact, not discriminatory intent.74 The Supreme Court has
stated that the essence of discrimination in the employment context is ‘‘the
arbitrariness of the barriers imposed, whether intentionally or unwittingly”.75
Accordingly, whether the workplace discrimination results from an employer’s
conscious decision to discriminate, a good faith decision that nonetheless has a
discriminatory impact, a decision influenced by unconscious bias, or even a
decision that arguably involves more automation than it does human judgment,
it is all discrimination in the eyes of the law.
Just as there is no requirement to show intent to discriminate, there is no
need to establish that a protected ground was the sole or even the main factor in
the adverse impact; it need only be ‘‘a” factor.76 Nor is there a requirement to
show ‘‘directness”.77 In the hiring context, this proposition is expressly
recognized in the Canadian Human Rights Act, which prohibits persons from
‘‘directly or indirectly” refusing to employ a person based on a prohibited
ground,78 and in the Ontario Human Rights Code, which contains a provision to
the same effect.79 In addition, the common law recognizes that prohibitions
against indirect discrimination are implicit in human rights legislation, even
where no explicit prohibition is present.80 Indirect discrimination occurs ‘‘when
discrimination is accomplished on prohibited grounds without explicit reference
to the grounds”.81 The classic example is a facially neutral policy — e.g., ‘‘all
Law, supra note 46 at 214.As a corollary, a finding of discrimination does not necessarily
entail a finding of moral blameworthiness. See Action Travail des Femmes, supra note 52
at 1134-35; Ball, supra note 55, § 33:20.3.
74 See Ball, supra note 55, § 33:10.4.
75 MUHC, supra note 53 at para 48.
76 See Bombardier, supra note 73 at para 52; Moore v. British Columbia (Ministry of
Education), 2012 SCC 61, 2012 CarswellBC 3446, 2012 CarswellBC 3447 (S.C.C.) at
para. 33; R. v. Bushnell Communications Ltd., 1974 CarswellOnt 470, 4 O.R. (2d) 288
(Ont. C.A.) at 290 [O.R.];Holden v. Canadian National Railway, 1990 CarswellNat 847,
14 C.H.R.R. D/12 (Fed. C.A.) at D/15 [C.H.R.R.]; Phipps v. Toronto Police Services
Board, 2010 ONSC 3884, 2010 CarswellOnt 7582 (Ont. Div. Ct.) at para. 76, affirmed
2012 ONCA 155, 2012 CarswellOnt 3992 (Ont. C.A.); Rafiq v. Scotia Capital Inc., 2010
HRTO 697 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.) at para. 29.
77 See England, Employment Law, supra note 46 at 214. The distinction between direct and
indirect discrimination, which used to be play a central role in determining the
employer’s duty of reasonable accommodation, was removed in British Columbia
(Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.E.U., 1999 CarswellBC 1907,
1999 CarswellBC 1908, (sub nom. British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations
Commission) v. BCGSEU) [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [Meiorin]. See Stan Lanyon,
‘‘Conceptual Challenges in the Application of Discrimination Law in the Workplace”
(2014) 3:1 Can. J. Hum. Rts. 75.
78 Canadian Human Rights Act, supra note 41, s. 7.
79 Ontario Human Rights Code, supra note 42, s. 9.
80 See Simpsons-Sears, supra note 60 at para 18; England, Employment Law, supra note 46
at 221-22.
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employees are expected to work on Sundays” — that nonetheless has a
discriminatory effect.82
With this legal framework in mind, the section below unpacks the ways in
which hiring algorithms can mitigate certain hiring discrimination risks, as well
as their limits in this respect and their potential capacity to introduce certain
concerns over systemic discrimination.
III. HIRING ALGORITHMS AND WORKPLACE EQUALITY
(1) The Promise of Hiring Algorithms: Mitigating Certain Hiring
Discrimination Risks
When used carefully, hiring algorithms may mitigate certain hiring
discrimination risks. Support for this proposition begins with the recognition
that human decisions, including those related to hiring, are influenced by the
biases, stereotypes, and prejudices of their maker.83 Of particular concern are
unconscious biases, which operate outside conscious attentional focus. 84 The
research on unconscious bias confirms that human decision makers ‘‘do not
always have conscious, intentional control over the processes of social
perception, impression formation, and judgment that motivate their actions”.85
Unconscious bias is of particular concern in the employment context because it is
pervasive and plays a causal role in hiring discrimination.86 As the Ontario
Human Rights Tribunal stated in Blakely v. Queen’s University,87 ‘‘it is not
uncommon that unstated and sometimes even unconscious biases may affect a
hiring decision”.88
Alongside unconscious bias is stereotyping.89 According to social cognition
theory, stereotyping is part of normal cognitive functioning.90 This theory posits
that our brains are wired to stereotype; it is something our brains do to ‘‘simplify
the task of perceiving, processing, and retaining information about people in
81 Ball, supra note 55, § 33:20.2.
82 See ibid, § 33:20.6. See alsoQuébec (Commission des droits de la personne&des droits de la
jeunesse) c. Gaz Métropolitain inc., 2011 QCCA 1201, 2011 CarswellQue 6683, 2011
CarswellQue 15856 (C.A. Que.) at para. 38.
83 See Kim, supra note 4 at 870.
84 See Anthony G Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, ‘‘Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations” (2006) 94:4 Cal. L. Rev. 945 at 947.
85 See ibid at 946.
86 See ibid at 966.
87 Blakely v. Queen’s University, 2012 HRTO 1177 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.).
88 Ibid. at para 40.
89 See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 84 at 949 (defining a social ‘‘stereotype” as ‘‘a
mental association between a social group or category and a trait”).
90 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, ‘‘Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity” (1995) 47:6 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 at
1188.
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memory”.91 Once these stereotypes become ingrained, they influence intergroup
judgment and decision making, ‘‘biasing in predictable ways the perception,
interpretation, encoding, retention, and recall of information about other
people”, and they do so regardless of awareness or intention.92 Though we may
wish it were otherwise, we all engage in stereotyping and suffer from biases,
whether conscious or unconscious.93
Turning to the hiring context, empirical studies performed in North America
demonstrate that discrimination in hiring is not uncommon. In a study of data
from a 2011 Canadian employment audit, researchers from Ryerson University
and the University of Toronto found that for jobs requiring a university degree,
Asian-named applicants had a 32.6 per cent lower interview selection rate than
Anglo-named applicants, even when both groups had equivalent, all-Canadian
qualifications.94 In the United States, a well-known study published in 2000
found that when symphony orchestra auditions followed a blind process using a
screen to conceal the candidate’s identity from the jury, the chances of female
musicians advancing beyond the preliminary round and ultimately being selected
increased substantially.95 In another study, researchers from MIT and the
University of Chicago sent out 5,000 resumes in response to ‘‘help wanted” ads in
Boston and Chicago.96 They randomly assigned white-sounding names, such
Emily or Greg, and African American-sounding names, such as Lakisha or
Jamal, to the otherwise identical resumes. Their results, published in 2004,
showed that applicants with white-sounding names received 50 per cent more
call-backs than job applicants with African American-sounding names.
Research also demonstrates that we tend to hire those who are like ‘‘us” and
to view ‘‘others” less favourably, with people tending to hire from their own
social class, race, and gender.97 Psychologically, this may be due to our need for
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 See Jerry Kang, ‘‘Trojan Horses of Race” (2005) 118:5 Harv. L. Rev. 1489 at 1496;
Charles R. Lawrence II, ‘‘The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism” (1987) 39:2 Stan. L. Rev. 317 at 321. Both of the aforementioned
articles are cited in Chander, supra note 4 at 1028, n 26.
94 Rupe Banerjee, Jeffrey G. Reitz & Phil Oreopoulos, ‘‘Do Large Employers Treat Racial
Minorities More Fairly? An Analysis of Canadian Field Experiment Data” (2018) 44:1
Can. Pub. Pol’y 1.
95 Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, ‘‘Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of ‘Blind’
Auditions on Female Musicians” (2000) 90:4 Am. Econ. Rev. 715 at 716.
96 Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, ‘‘Are Emily and Greg More Employable
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on LaborMarket Discrimination” (2004)
94:4 Am. Econ. Rev. 991 at 997-99.
97 See Lauren A Rivera, ‘‘Hiring as Cultural Matching: The Case of Elite Professional
Service Firms” (2012) 77:6 Am. Soc. Rev. 999; Joseph G. Altonji & Rebecca M. Blank,
‘‘Race and Gender in the Labor Market” in Orley Ashenfelter & David Card, eds.,
Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3C (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1999) 3143, cited in
CIHR,Ethics ofAlgorithms, supranote 11 at 5. ‘‘Ingroup favouritism”has been shown to
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validation: by favouring those who we perceive to be like us, we validate our own
self-worth.
Reliance on informal assessments by individual interviewers creates an
increased risk of hiring discrimination.98 As the Ontario Human Rights
Commission describes, ‘‘conducting an interview by chatting with the
applicant to see if he or she shares similar interests and will ‘fit’ into the
organizational culture may present a barrier for persons who are or appear to be
different than the dominant norm in the workplace. If this is used as a starting
point for deciding whether candidates will be seen by senior decision-makers, this
creates a major barrier to persons protected by the [Human Rights Code]”.99
In sum, as the Centre for Internet and Human Rights observes, ‘‘human
hiring systems are far from perfect”.100
Enter hiring algorithms, which appear to offer an ostensibly objective and
impartial means of selecting candidates that does not suffer from the cognitive
imperfections and biases that we humans do. (More on that later.) In particular,
they promise to remove conscious and unconscious biases from the hiring
equation, resulting in a more objective and scientific process that better promotes
workplace equality. In this way, they can be viewed as part of a broader
movement in favour of evidence-based decision making.101
American law professor Anupam Chander argues that unconscious bias is
less likely to manifest itself through the process of algorithm programming than
through the process of human decision making because algorithm programming
‘‘requires a step-by-step writing process that depends on a conscious
understanding of what is sought”.102 He adds that to the extent the
discriminatory decisions humans make can be attributed to stereotypes formed
through a process of statistical discrimination, algorithms acting on ‘‘richer
information environments may not be subject to similar individually erroneous
statistical discrimination”.103 In other words, because algorithms can absorb a
more comprehensive dataset, they may be less susceptible to forming stereotypes,
which in turn makes them better able to make non-discriminatory hiring
decisions.
operate in the hiring context and result in discrimination. See Anthony G. Greenwald &
Thomas F. Pettigrew, ‘‘With Malice Toward None and Charity for Some: Ingroup
Favoritism Enables Discrimination” (2014) 69:7 American Psychologist 669 at 669;
Dustin Volz, ‘‘Silicon Valley Thinks It Has the Answer to Its Diversity Problem”, The
Atlantic (26 September 2014), online: <www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/09/
silicon-valley-thinks-it-has-the-answer-to-its-diversity-problem/431334>.
98 See Ontario Human Rights Commission, supra note 61.
99 Ibid.
100 CIHR, Ethics of Algorithms, supra note 11 at 5.
101 See World Wide Web Foundation, supra note 8 at 6.
102 Chander, supra note 4 at 1028-29.
103 Ibid. at 1030.
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But hiring algorithms, like human decision makers, are far from perfect.
Indeed, although they may address some of the flaws associated with human
decision making, they may also introduce new, unanticipated issues.104 Even
leading AI recruitment startups recognize the risks: the founder and CEO of one
such startup acknowledged in an interview that there is a ‘‘huge risk that using
AI in the recruiting process is going to increase bias and not reduce it”.105 It is
therefore essential to explore the limitations on hiring algorithms and to examine
their potential capacity to introduce concerns over discrimination, and in
particular systemic discrimination.
(2) The Challenges: Limitations and Concerns over Systemic Discrimination
(a) Bad Data, Bad Rules, or Both
Hiring algorithms may fail to deliver on their promise to the extent that they
act on bad data, apply bad rules, or do both.
i. Bad Data
The data fed into hiring algorithms will inevitably be tainted by real-world
biases, stereotypes, and injustices, and this may lead to a discriminatory outcome
that reinforces and reproduces marginalization.106 This is particularly so for
machine learning algorithms. As Chander writes, ‘‘[e]ven facially neutral
algorithms will produce discriminatory results because they train and operate
on the real world of pervasive discrimination”.107 English researchers Bryce
Goodman and Seth Flaxman make a similar observation: ‘‘machine learning can
reify existing patterns of discrimination — if they are found in the training
dataset, then by design an accurate classifier will reproduce them. In this way,
biased decisions are presented as the outcome of an ‘objective’ algorithm.”108
Scholars Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst put it this way: ‘‘an algorithm is only
as good as the data it works with”.109 As the saying goes, ‘‘garbage in, garbage
out”.110
104 See CIHR, Ethics of Algorithms, supra note 11 at 6.
105 Chandler, supra note 31.
106 See World Wide Web Foundation, supra note 8 at 9; Faisal Kamiran & Toon Calders,
‘‘Classifying Without Discriminating” (Paper delivered at the Second International
Conference on Computer, Control and Communication, Karachi, Pakistan, 17-18
February 2009) at 1, online: <ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4909197/>, cited in
Chander, supra note 4 at 1036.
107 Chander, supra note 4 at 1036. See also ibid (claiming that ‘‘ostensibly neutral algorithms
canproduce results that reflect the prejudices of society”);MoritzHardt, ‘‘HowBigData
IsUnfair”,Medium (26 September 2014), online:<medium.com/@mrtz/how-big-data-
is-unfair-9aa544d739de>; Joh, supra note 27 at 300.
108 Bryce Goodman & Seth Flaxman, ‘‘European Union Regulations on Algorithmic
Decision-Making and a ‘Right to Explanation’” (2017) 38:3 A.I. Magazine 50 at 3,
online: Cornell University Library <arxiv.org/abs/1606.08813>. See also Kim, supra
note 4 at 861.
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It is not hard to imagine how this issue can arise in the hiring algorithm
context. Consider, for example, an industry that has come to be male-dominated
as a result of years of systemic discrimination against women. If a hiring
algorithm is designed (or learns) to assign weight to years of industry experience,
then women will tend to score less favourably than men simply because they have
historically been shut out of the industry. Thus, by acting on data tainted by
discrimination, the hiring algorithm reproduces historical injustices.
Barocas and Selbst highlight a further data-related issue: disadvantaged
groups may be misrepresented in datasets upon which algorithms rely, producing
discriminatory results.111 The researchers cite concerns over ‘‘the nonrandom,
systemic omission of people who live on big data’s margins, whether due to
poverty, geography, or lifestyle, and whose lives are less ‘datafied’ than the
general population’s”,112 as well as the concern that ‘‘[b]ecause not all data is
created or even collected equally, there are ‘signal problems’ in big-data sets —
dark zones or shadows where some citizens and communities are overlooked or
underrepresented”.113 They suggest that as a consequence of the higher incidence
of data misrepresentation in the case of members of disadvantaged groups, the
conclusions drawn from the data will be skewed, which may have a
disproportionate and discriminatory effect on protected groups to the extent
that the group’s disadvantage is correlated with protected characteristics.114
We can readily envision how this type of data misrepresentation and
resulting discrimination might occur in the hiring algorithm context. For
example, members of marginalized communities with limited access to the
Internet have an impaired ability to build up their professional presence on the
Internet (e.g., a LinkedIn profile, a blog, a personal webpage displaying their
personal portfolio, etc.). If a hiring algorithm is designed (or learns) to assign
weight to the quality of a candidate’s Internet presence, members of marginalized
communities with limited access to the Internet would be at a distinct
disadvantage.
One group of researchers suggests a potential response to the issue of bad
data: partially repairing the data fed into the algorithm so as to make the data
109 Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4 at 671. See also Chandler, supra note 31; Jackie Snow,
‘‘NewResearch Aims to Solve the Problem of AI Bias in ‘Black Box’ Algorithms”,MIT
Technology Review (7 November 2017), online: <www.technologyreview.com/s/
609338/new-research-aims-to-solve-the-problem-of-ai-bias-in-black-box-algo-
rithms>; Chander, supra note 4 at 1036.
110 Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4 at 683.
111 Ibid. at 684-85.
112 Ibid. at 684, citing Jonas Lerman, ‘‘Big Data and Its Exclusions” (2013) 66 Stan. L. Rev.
Online 55 at 57, online: <www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-and-big-data-
big-data-and-its-exclusions>.
113 Kate Crawford, ‘‘Think Again: Big Data”, Foreign Policy (May 10, 2013), online:
<www.foreignpolicy.com/articies/2013/05/09/thinkagain-bigdata>.
114 Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4 at 684.
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unbiased.115 While this process may mitigate the issue to some extent, it is an
incomplete solution. One can repair biased data only so much, and identifying
when and in what ways data is biased may be challenging if not impossible in
some cases.
ii. Bad Rules
Beyond the issue of bad data, a hiring algorithm based on poorly designed
rules is liable to produce discriminatory results. Obviously, an algorithm that is
deliberately designed to disfavour certain candidates based on protected
characteristics is discriminatory, but in practice bad rules ares more likely to
arise inadvertently. For example, consider a hiring algorithm that is designed (or
learns) to favour candidates who have steady, uninterrupted work histories —
this may be seen as a proxy for dependability. Such a rule would disadvantage
women since, in Canada, women are statistically more likely than men are to take
parental leave or to temporarily withdraw from the workforce in order to raise
children.116 In legal terms, the outcome may be systemic discrimination: ‘‘policies
or procedures [that] impact disproportionately on certain statutorily protected
groups”.117 Importantly, based on the legal principles identified in Part II of this
article, this conclusion holds whether or not the rule was intended to produce
discriminatory results. What matters is discriminatory impact, not discriminatory
intent.
The issue of bad rules becomes more complex where machine learning
algorithms are involved. As computer scientist Ben Shneiderman observes,
machine learning algorithms are ‘‘more concerning because if you’re automating
a process, then you’re reducing the opportunities for a human being to check the
bias”.118 The machine learning algorithm may teach itself to apply
discriminatory rules, and the opportunity for human intervention is reduced.
For example, it may determine that there is a correlation between race and
promotion rates and develop a discriminatory hiring rule based on this
correlation, without any direction from its human creator.
As this example demonstrates, machine learning algorithms may discover
and act on correlations that have little or no connection to the candidate’s actual
qualifications. The data mining techniques employed by machine learning
algorithms generally seek out ‘‘any statistical relationship between variables
present in the data, regardless of whether the reasons for the relationship are
understood”.119 This can lead to problems. For example, based on past data, a
115 Feldman et al, ‘‘Certifying andRemovingDisparate Impact” (Extended version of paper
accepted at 2015 ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data
Mining), online: Cornell University Library <arxiv.org/abs/1412.3756>.
116 See Ontario Human Rights Commission, supra note 61.
117 Crockford, supra note 68 at para 49.
118 Christina Couch, ‘‘Ghosts in the Machine”, PBS (25 October 2017), online:
<www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/tech/ai-bias>.
119 Kim, supra note 4 at 865.
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machine learning algorithm may discover that the name ‘‘Rick” is associated
with higher work performance. The discriminatory impact that a decision-
making rule based on this correlation would have been obvious. Or a machine
learning algorithm may learn that people who live closer to work are statistically
more likely to stay with the company over the long term, and it may in turn
develop a hiring rule based on this correlation. Yet this is another ‘‘bad rule”.
One’s area code has no bearing on one’s qualifications. This is problematic
because, as the Ontario Human Rights Commission explains, ‘‘Employers must
make sure that only information about qualifications and job requirements is
considered when making hiring decisions”.120 Consequently, prospective
employers who rely on hiring algorithms risk denying candidates positions
based on unexplained correlations that have little to no connection to the
candidate’s actual qualifications.121 Furthermore, the rule developed by the
algorithm in the example above may have a disparate impact on protected
groups to the extent that race, nationality, and other protected characteristics
may be correlated with residency. Similar discriminatory effects may arise
through other correlations discovered and acted upon.
However, the risk of bad rules can be mitigated to some degree through
careful study, design, and monitoring. Machine learning algorithms should not
simply be left to their own devices. Shneiderman suggests that algorithm logs
that are capable of comprehension should be produced so that the basic rules
underlying an algorithm can be kept in check.122 That said, while the risk of
algorithmic discrimination can be mitigated to some degree, it cannot be
excluded entirely.123
Finally, while it may seem like an attractive solution to simply remove the
consideration of protected characteristics from the hiring algorithm’s calculus,
this will not solve the problem, and in fact several scholars have argued
persuasively that omitting protected characteristics would be counterproductive
and would only increase the risk of discrimination.124 The simple removal of a
variable from a dataset does not mean it will not appear elsewhere in the data, as
other variables that have a close correlation with the excluded variable may serve
as proxies.125 As U.S. law professor Pauline Kim writes, ‘‘[b]ecause other
information contained in large datasets can serve as a proxy for race, disability,
or other protected statuses, simply eliminating data on those characteristics
cannot prevent models that are biased along these dimensions”.126
120 Ontario Human Rights Commission, supra note 61.
121 See Kim, supra note 4 at 865; King & Mrkonich, supra note 4 at 572-73.
122 See Couch, supra note 118; Ben Shneiderman, ‘‘The Dangers of Faulty, Biased, or
Malicious Algorithms Requires Independent Oversight” (2016) 113: 48 P.N.A.S. 13538,
online: <www.pnas.org/content/pnas/113/48/13538.full.pdf>.
123 See Volz, supra note 97.
124 See e.g. JoshuaA. Kroll et al., ‘‘Accountable Algorithms” (2017) 165:3 U. Penn. L. Rev.
633 at 685; Kim, supra note 4 at 904, 918; Chander, supra note 4.
125 See Kim, supra note 4 at 880, citing Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4.
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iii. Both
The issues of bad data and bad rules may overlap — indeed, they may be
inseparable. As explained above, algorithms must be viewed in their broader
context, as they form part of an interconnected system.127 Biases, stereotypes,
and injustices may be traced to the designer of the algorithm, the data to which it
is applied, society more broadly, or some combination of the foregoing.128 The
interaction between bad rules and bad data may create a feedback loop that
perpetuates and exacerbates existing biases, stereotypes, and injustices.
Finally, whether the problem is bad data, bad rules, or both, the concerns
expressed above cannot be dismissed on the basis that the blame lies not with
humans, but with hiring algorithms. From a legal perspective, no existing
doctrine permits an employer to avoid liability for hiring discrimination on the
basis that the discriminatory effect stemmed from its decision to use a particular
technology, though in theory it might be able to seek an indemnity from an
algorithm supplier if permitted by the parties’ contract. On a more philosophical
level, all hiring algorithms, even those that use machine learning technology, are
designed and implemented by humans. As such, we must take responsibility for
the results produced by hiring algorithms. This sentiment is captured by the
Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency in Machine Learning group, which
observes that ‘‘[a]lgorithms and the data that drive them are designed and created
by people — [t]here is always a human ultimately responsible for decisions made
or informed by an algorithm . . . ‘[t]he algorithm did it’ is not an acceptable
excuse”.129
There is a further risk that the problems identified above will be overlooked
based on a false belief that hiring algorithms are inherently fair and objective.
That risk is discussed below.
(b) Ostensible Fairness and Objectivity
Hiring algorithms appear to be inherently fair and objective. As Chander
writes, ‘‘[a]lgorithms can make decisionmaking seem fair precisely because
computers are logical entities which should not be infected by all-too-human
bias”.130 The use of algorithms may thereby give the decision-making process ‘‘‘a
patina of inevitability’ . . . and indeed a patina of fairness”.131 Similarly, as U.S.
126 Kim, supra note 4 at 898.
127 See World Wide Web Foundation, supra note 8 at 9.
128 See ibid, citing Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, ‘‘Big Data and Due Process: Toward a
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms” (2014) 55:1 B.C. L. Rev. 93; Barocas
& Selbst, supra note 4.
129 Fairness, Accountability and Transparency in Machine Learning, ‘‘Principles for
Accountable Algorithms”, online: <www.fatml.org/resources/principles-for-accoun-
table-algorithms>.
130 Chander, supra note 4 at 1034. See also Hardt, supra note 107.
131 Chander, supra note 4 at 1034, citing Frank Pasquale,TheBlack Box Society: The Secret
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law professor Elizabeth Joh writes, ‘‘the very idea of algorithmic decisionmaking
may subtly appeal to us as objective because of its mathematical basis”.132 Data
scientist Fred Benenson cautions against giving in to ‘‘mathwashing”, the
assumption that algorithmic models are free from subjectivity because they
involve math.133 There is a sense that because the algorithm is acting on data, not
merely on personal impressions, its output must be fair. There is also a sense of
inevitability that attaches to the outcome of an algorithm — a sense that the
result could not have been any other way. This lends legitimacy to hiring
algorithms.
But despite the apparent fairness and objectivity of hiring algorithms, the
results they produce may nonetheless be discriminatory. Just as an objective,
facially neutral policy subjecting different groups to the same standards can
result in prima facie discrimination,134 so too can the application of an objective,
facially neutral rule applied by a hiring algorithm.135 The Canadian
jurisprudence makes clear that the mere fact that an employment policy is
applied uniformly to all applicants, and is used for sound business reasons in
good faith, does not mean its application cannot result in unlawful
discrimination.136 This principle can be applied in the context of hiring
algorithms: a hiring algorithm may be designed with the best of intentions and
may be equally applicable to all job applicants, but if it produces a
discriminatory result, these features will provide no defence.
Moreover, scholars have challenged the notion that algorithms are
objective.137 Researcher Tarleton Gillespie, describes the ‘‘promise of
algorithmic objectivity” as ‘‘the way the technical character of the algorithm is
positioned as an assurance of impartiality”.138 He suggests that the performance
of ‘‘algorithmic objectivity” is fundamental to the legitimacy of algorithms.139 He
writes: ‘‘More than mere tools, algorithms are also stabilizers of trust, practical
and symbolic assurances that their evaluations are fair and accurate, and free
from subjectivity, error, or attempted influence. But, though algorithms may
Algorithms That Control Money and Information (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2015) at 15.
132 Joh, supra note 27 at 292.
133 Tyler Woods, ‘‘‘Mathwashing,’ Facebook and the Zeitgeist of Data Worship”,
Technical.ly, online: <technical.ly/brooklyn/2016/06/08/fred-benenson-mathwashing-
facebook-data-worship>, cited in Joh, supra note 27 at 292.
134 SeeMeiorin, supra note 77.
135 See Chander, supra note 4 at 1024.
136 See Simpsons-Sears, supra note 60 at para 18.
137 See, e.g.,GideonMann&CathyO’Neil, ‘‘HiringAlgorithmsAreNotNeutral”,Harvard
Business Review (9 December 2016), online: <hbr.org/2016/12/hiring-algorithms-are-
not-neutral>.
138 Gillespie, supra note 6 at 168.
139 Ibid. at 180.
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appear to be automatic and untarnished by the interventions of their providers,
this is a carefully crafted fiction.”140
Scholars have also observed that although algorithms may be assumed to be
objective and free from bias, an algorithm ‘‘will reflect the perspective and biases
of its creators”.141 Gideon Mann and Cathy O’Neil argue that ‘‘[a]lgorithms are,
in part, our opinions embedded in code. They reflect human biases and
prejudices that lead to machine learning mistakes and misinterpretations”.142
In sum, despite their appearance, hiring algorithms are not inherently fair
and objective. But even if users recognize the need to critically assess hiring
algorithms despite their apparent fairness and objectivity, they may be limited in
their ability to do so as a result of the proprietary nature and opacity of many
algorithms.
(c) Proprietary Nature and Opacity
In a June 2017 white paper entitled Algorithmic Accountability,143 the World
Wide Web Foundation acknowledged both the growing need to scrutinize
algorithms and the barriers to performing that scrutiny, emphasizing that ‘‘the
outcomes of algorithmic processes are often not designed to be accessible,
verified or evaluated by humans, limiting our ability to identify if, when, where,
and why the algorithm produced harm — and worse still — redress this
harm”.144 Consistent with observation, algorithms have frequently been
described in the literature as ‘‘black boxes”145 and have been criticized as
being both ‘‘proprietary and opaque”.146 Joh suggests that the term ‘‘black box”
can be applied to algorithms in two senses. First, ‘‘the calculations used [by the
algorithm] to make a decision may be inscrutable to the person affected by that
140 Ibid. at 179.
141 Joh, supra note 27 at 292.
142 Mann & O’Neil, supra note 137.
143 World Wide Web Foundation, supra note 8.
144 World Wide Web Foundation, supra note 8 at 4.
145 See e.g. Pasquale, supra note 131 at 3 (Pasquale describes a ‘‘black box” as ‘‘a system
whoseworkings aremysterious; we can observe its inputs and outputs, butwe cannot tell
how one becomes the other”); Nicholas Diakopoulos, Algorithmic Accountability
Reporting: On the Investigation of Black Boxes (Tow Center for Digital Journalism,
Columbia Journalism School, December 2013), online: <towcenter.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/02/78524_Tow-Center-Report-WEB-1.pdf>; World Wide Web Foun-
dation, supra note 8 at 12; Claire Cain Miller, ‘‘When Algorithms Discriminate”, The
New York Times (9 July 2015), online: <www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/upshot/when-
algorithms-discriminate.html>. But see Gillespie, supra note 6 at 178 (suggesting that
the ‘‘black box” metaphor is inapt to the extent that algorithms may be adjusted or
‘‘tweaked” by its creator).
146 Sarah Tan et al., ‘‘Detecting Bias in Black-Box Models Using Transparent Model
Distillation” (Paper delivered at the Neural Information Processing Systems 2017
Symposium on Interpretable Machine Learning, Montreal, Canada, updated 18
November 2017) at 1, online: <arxiv.org/abs/1710.06169>.
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decision”, and ‘‘as machine learning algorithms become more complex, they may
be inscrutable to the programmers themselves”.147 Second, ‘‘the companies that
create [algorithms] often refuse to divulge information about them”.148
Hiring algorithms may be inaccessible by design. Suppliers may offer clients
the right to use their algorithms for a fee, without revealing the underlying code,
which is protected as proprietary. It has been suggested that most employers who
use hiring algorithms rely on ‘‘out-of-the-box” algorithms without fully
understanding how those algorithms actually work.149 In addition, some
algorithms are subject to non-disclosure agreements.150 Furthermore, it has
been suggested that while hiring algorithms could be made open source, it would
be unrealistic to insist on complete transparency, as doing so would result in
public disclosure of commercial proprietary information and trade secrets.151
The proprietary nature and opacity of hiring algorithms limit the ability to
critically assess the algorithm and identify whether (and if so, why) it may create
or perpetuate injustices, still less resolve the issue.152 In the words of the Centre
for Internet and Human Rights, ‘‘[i]f an algorithm is opaque, it becomes
impossible for outsiders to understand the rationale behind any particular
outcome, or when algorithms are misused”.153 Put differently, it is impossible to
take a look under the hood.
Machine learning algorithms present a higher level of opacity than ‘‘plain
vanilla” algorithms. Machine learning algorithms do not operate on the basis of
factors and weights identified in advance by its human programmers; rather, they
construct a model based on the data correlations it discovers in the data to which
it is exposed.154 As Kim writes, ‘‘[w]hen [a machine learning algorithm] is relied
on to screen or rank applicants, it obscures the basis on which employers are
making ultimate employment decisions. This lack of transparency makes it
difficult to know if any observed bias is simply a byproduct of justifiable business
considerations or the result of flaws in the model’s construction”.155 Moreover, a
machine learning algorithm may reshape itself over time to the point where we
can no longer understand it.156
One consequence of the opaque, proprietary nature of hiring algorithms is
that it becomes very difficult for anyone, including potential claimants, to detect
147 Joh, supra note 27 at 292-93.
148 Ibid. at 293.
149 See World Wide Web Foundation, supra note 8 at 12.
150 See Christina Counch, ‘‘Ghost in the Machine”, PBS (25 October 2017), online:
<www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/tech/ai-bias/>.
151 See Kroll et al, supra note 124 at 639, 658, cited in Chander, supra note 4 at 1040.
152 World Wide Web Foundation, supra note 8 at 4.
153 CIHR, Ethics of Algorithms, supra note 11 at 11.
154 Kim, supra note 4 at 881.
155 Ibid. at 881.
156 See Chander, supra note 4 at 1040; CIHR, Ethics of Algorithms, supra note 11 at 3.
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whether unlawful discrimination may have occurred, and even more difficult to
find proof. The Canadian case law recognizes that in the absence of a ‘‘smoking
gun”, it is exceedingly difficult to establish hiring discrimination.157 That
difficulty is particularly acute in the context of hiring algorithms. A hiring
algorithm that takes in massive amounts of data and applies a complex or even
unknown formula to make a hiring decision may make it practically impossible
to determine whether discrimination has occurred.
The opacity of hiring algorithms can present legal issues for employers as
well. For example, if a prima facie case of discrimination is made out, the opacity
of hiring algorithms may present an impediment to the employer’s ability to
discharge its onus of offering a reasonable, non-discriminatory explanation for
why the claimant was denied employment. Accordingly, both prospective
employees and the prospective employers have a shared interest in ensuring
hiring algorithms are transparent and understandable. However, this shared
interest sits at tension with the interest of the supplier of the hiring algorithm,
which is to ensure its source code remains a proprietary trade secret.
One potential response to the opacity of hiring algorithms is to require
transparency through legislation. In response to concerns over the black box
nature of algorithms, some have advocated for a ‘‘right to explanation” (i.e., an
individual’s right to an explanation of how algorithmic decisions affecting them
are made). Indeed, since it came into force in May 2018, the European Union’s
General Data Protection Regulation158 (GDPR) has, at least in effect, recognized
a right to explanation (in certain circumstances) across all EU member states.159
Articles 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g), and 15(1)(h) of the GDPR require ‘‘data controllers”
to provide ‘‘data subjects”, neither of which is defined in the GDPR, with
information about ‘‘the existence of automated decision-making, including
profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) and, at least in those cases,
meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and
the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject”. Article 22(1)
provides that data subjects ‘‘have the right not to be subject to a decision based
solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects
concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her”. Article 22(2)
identifies circumstances in which decisions based solely on automated processing
are permitted, such as where the decision ‘‘(a) is necessary for entering into, or
157 See Basi, supra note 65 at D/5038.
158 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data andon theFreeMovement of SuchData, andRepealingDirective 95/46/EC [2016]
OJ L 119/1.
159 See Andrew D. Selbst & Julia Powles, ‘‘Meaningful Information and the Right to
Explanation” (2017) 7:4 Int’L Data Privacy Law 233; Goodman & Flaxman, supra note
108. But see Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, ‘‘Why a Right to
Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data
Protection Regulation” (2017) 7:2 Int’l Data Privacy Law 76 (arguing that the GDPR
does not create a ‘‘right to explanation”).
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performance of, a contract between the data subject and a data controller” or
‘‘(c) is based on the data subject’s explicit consent”. Article 22(3) provides that
where either of these two conditions apply, ‘‘the data controller shall implement
suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and
legitimate interests, at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of
the controller, to express his or her point of view and to contest the decision.”
Article 22(4) stipulates that decisions made under Article 22(2) shall not be based
on special categories of personal data160 unless certain conditions are met. These
provisions could readily be applied in the context of hiring algorithms, and they
offer one model that could be adopted through domestic legislation in Canada.
Another response would be to establish one or more public bodies to regulate
and oversee algorithms. The idea has already been floated in the United States.
For example, Andrew Tutt, a lawyer based in Washington, D.C., has suggested
that a specialist regulatory agency be formed to oversee the use and sale
algorithms.161 He envisions an agency similar to the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration. Essentially, under Tutt’s model, hiring algorithms could be
treated as a potentially hazardous product, subject to regulatory oversight and
testing. Similarly, American computer scientist and professor Ben Shneiderman
has proposed an ‘‘Algorithm Safety Board” that would oversee high-stakes
algorithms and investigate problems.162
But even if algorithms were transparent in their design, several researchers
have argued that this would still not be enough.163 For example, Mike Ananny
and Kate Crawford argue that being able to see a system is insufficient to
understand how that system actually works and to govern it.164 Similarly,
Cynthia Dwork and Professor Deirdre Mulligan maintain that ‘‘it is
unreasonable to expect transparency alone to root out bias”.165 Chander
argues that rather than transparency in the design of the algorithm, what is
needed is transparency in its inputs and outputs.166 He proposes that the focus be
160 Those special categories are listed inArticle 9(1): ‘‘personal data revealing racial or ethnic
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership,
and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying
a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or
sexual orientation”.
161 Andrew Tutt, ‘‘An FDA for Algorithms” (2016) 69 Admin. L. Rev. 83.
162 Ben Shneiderman, ‘‘The Dangers of Faulty, Biased, or Malicious Algorithms Requires
Independent Oversight” (2016) 113: 48 P.N.A.S. 13538, online: <www.pnas.org/
content/pnas/113/48/13538.full.pdf>.
163 See generally Kroll et al, supra note 124.
164 Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, ‘‘Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of the
Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability” (2016) New
Media & Society 1 at 1, cited in World Wide Web Foundation, supra note 8 at 10.
165 Cynthia Dwork & Deirdre K. Mulligan, ‘‘It’s Not Privacy, and It’s Not Fair” (2013) 66
Stan. L. Rev. Online 35 at 37, online: <review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/
sites/3/2016/08/DworkMullliganSLR.pdf>, cited in Chander, supra note 4 at 1040.
166 Chander, supra note 4 at 1039.
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placed not on merely seeking transparency of algorithmic design, but rather on
the following question: Are protected groups receiving statistically worse results,
given their relevant characteristics?167 Chander thus places the focus on
outcomes, rather than on the mechanics of the algorithm.
Finally, although hiring algorithms may be criticized as ‘‘black boxes”, the
human mind is no more transparent.168 As Chander argues, ‘‘[t]he ultimate black
box is the human mind” and ‘‘[p]rejudices acted upon in this black box never
have to be written down”.169 For this reason, it cannot be said that relying solely
on human decision making would remove all concerns over opacity in the hiring
process. There will always be some level of opacity in hiring decisions. But that
does not mean we should take steps to make hiring algorithms, in both their
design and their inputs and outputs, more transparent and intelligible.
IV. CONCLUSION
A number of commentators have expressed optimism about the potential
social and legal impacts of algorithms. 170 In the employment context, there is
good reason to think that hiring algorithms can, if used carefully, mitigate
certain discrimination risks. The overarching message of this article is not that
algorithms have no place in the hiring process or that they cannot assist in
achieving greater workplace equality. Rather, it is that they are no panacea
against hiring discrimination. As long as biases, prejudices, and injustices exist,
hiring algorithms will run the risk of reproducing and reinforcing them. Hiring
algorithms cannot eliminate discrimination, and in fact they may introduce
certain concerns over systemic discrimination. Accordingly, we should view
hiring algorithms for what they are: a set of rules designed to solve a particular
problem. These rules are not perfect, nor are the data they act upon. If employers
167 Ibid.
168 See Kroll et al, supra note 124 at 634 (observing that ‘‘[t]he implicit (or explicit) biases of
human decisionmakers can be difficult to find and root out, but we can peer into the
‘brain’ of an algorithm”).
169 Ibid. at 1030.
170 See e.g. Goodman & Flaxman, supra note 108 at 7 (arguing that ‘‘properly applied,
algorithms can not only make more accurate predictions, but offer increased
transparency and fairness over their human counterparts”); Rónán Kennedy, ‘‘Algo-
rithms and the Rule of Law” (2017) 17 Legal Info. Mgmt. 170 at 172 (stating that
‘‘[d]igital technology . . . offers opportunities for transparency and empowerment, and
properly designed systems may . . . help to overcome bias and prejudice.”); Kim, supra
note 4 at 873 (maintaining that ‘‘[d]ata analytics . . . hold the potential to reduce biases
and increase opportunities in the workplace for traditionally disadvantaged groups. But
much depends on how data are used”); Florentine, supra note 29 (citing the CEO of an
industry advocacy group who claims that ‘‘[w]hether by eliminating unconscious bias in
general or attacking specific manifestations of bias in recruiting, screening and hiring
talent, AI and machine learning has potential to level the playing field for women and
other underrepresented minorities and provide a competitive advantage for compa-
nies”).
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decide to use hiring algorithms, they should do so in a careful, conscientious
manner, fully aware of the benefits they offer and the risks they present.
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